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secrecy.” By controlling the media and redirecting collective attention by way
of rhetorical sleight of hand, the two are able to sow disorder and confusion 
such that their secrecy may persist out in the open. Despite using similar 
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In this article, we reimagine the role of the paranoid style by two world
leaders, President Donald Trump of the United States and Prime Minister of 
Hungary, Viktor Orbán, in light of the cultural, political, economic, and 
technological changes that significantly altered the geo-political situation. In 
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particular, we examine Trump and Orban's rhetorical strategies as a 
manifestation of “public secrecy,” which necessary to understand the current 
shift towards populism in Western democracies. As civic institutions are 
undermined, the public sphere is polarized, and collective memory 
obfuscated, the paranoid leader is able to hide their true motivations by 
relying upon the chaos they produce. Their success is due in large part to 
the ability to distract and divert attention on non-issues, control and 
manipulate the media, and provide false narratives via public gaslighting, all 
of which are made exponentially more effective with the creation of a 
nebulous, ill-defined enemy. Given the distinct cultures and histories of 
Hungary and the U.S., respective paranoid leaders deploy these strategies 
differently. We take a comparative approach in this article in order to 
illustrate how neither Trump or Orbán’s rise to power is unique, but rather is 
representative of a larger populist turn that utilizes tactics that embrace 
public secrecy and threaten the legacy of Western liberal democracy.
The Paranoid Style and Public Secrecy
Since its publication in 1964, Richard Hofstadter’s germane essay, “The
Paranoid Style in American Politics,” continues to be popular in academic 
scholarship, with a wide range of fields using his framework as a critical tool 
to deconstruct everything from Ancient Greek paranoia (Sagan 1991), the 
role of collective memory in South Africa (Fassin 2008) to grassroots calls to 
amend tax law (Zelenak 2014). The paranoid style has transcended 
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academic circles and is part of a broader lexicon, making fairly recent 
appearances in popular media like The Atlantic (Douthat 2008), The 
American Conservative (Jenkins 2013), The Economist (“The Paranoid Style 
in American Politics” 2006), and the New York Times (Edsall 2016). Within 
the rhetorical field, there is also a wealth of scholarship (Caliendo 1999; 
Goldzwig 1991; Howell 2012; Lattin 2000; Nikolaev and Porpora 2006), yet 
there is a failure to acknowledge the implications of technological advances 
(particularly social media) and the unforeseeable national and global crises 
that have greatly impacted the contemporary rhetorical situation. While the 
major themes remain relevant, the cultural, political, and economic 
landscape from which Hofstadter’s original argument emerged, as well as  
subsequent scholarship, merits revisiting in light of the current 
circumstances. The increased ubiquity of news media, especially the swift 
rise of social media and the ability to personalize one’s news experience, the 
shifts in educational priorities, and the rise of nationalism echo parts of 
Hofstadter’s original position, but have come together to pose a problem 
unique in the current state of affairs. One important element that we stress 
in this article is the discursive connection between a paranoid leader and the
collective mindset they are cultivating through ideological manipulation.
According to Hofstadter (2008, 4), the paranoid style is the driving 
force behind minority – sometimes fringe – leaders who adopt the view of 
“the hostile and conspiratorial world…as directed against a nation, a culture, 
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a way of life whose fate affects not himself alone but millions of others.” 
Unlike psychotic paranoia as defined by a clinician, (often uncontrolled and 
devoid of reason), the persecution expressed through the paranoid style 
“begins with certain defensible judgments” (Hofstadter 2008, 36), which are 
then extended to unreasonable demands by a “leap of imagination” 
(Hofstadter 2008, 37). Consequently, “catastrophe or the fear of catastrophe
is most likely to elicit the syndrome of paranoid rhetoric” (Hofstadter 2008, 
39, emphasis added). As a result, the paranoid rhetor is able to circumvent 
the necessary warrants and support required in traditional argumentation so 
as to arrive upon the extreme conclusion they desire.
U.S. history indicates a long-standing legacy of such rhetoric (and the 
subsequent policy revisions) surrounding critical moments, particularly 
during times of war. For example, consider the numerous times the United 
States limited constitutional rights in response to perceived threats. The XYZ
Affair brought about the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. The Civil War led 
President Lincoln to suspend habeas corpus. World War I inspired the 
Espionage Act of 1917 and Sedition Act of 1918, which were legitimized in 
the nation’s first Supreme Court decisions curbing the First Amendment. 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s internment camps responded to the presumed
threat of Japanese-American citizens, again legitimized by the Supreme 
Court in Korematsu v. United States. McCarthy’s red scare, Nixon subverting
his political opponents, and Bush’s “War on Terror” all illustrate the ease with
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which a democratic nation can slip into authoritarian policies for fear that 
their way of life will be taken away, often at the behest of a leader stoking 
paranoia.
The paranoid style is not absent in European politics, though the 
theoretical lens has only recently been applied to understanding the political 
situation in the European Union (EU). The paranoid style has gone global 
partly due to the global economic crisis of 2008 and growing distrust in 
governing institutions (Drezner 2010). This distrust, Drezner argues, played 
out in many national elections, most notably the 2010 parliamentary election
in Hungary wherein the right-wing party, Fidesz, took the majority, and the 
far right-wing anti-Semitic and anti-Gypsy minority opposition party, Jobbik, 
finished third. Jobbik was able to successfully push the platform and the 
rhetoric of the established conservative party, Fidesz, further to the right. By
appealing to Jobbik supporters, Fidesz gained the support of the public and 
gained control of public opinion – a position they have securely maintained 
to the present day. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, 
Fidesz has introduced a number of nationalistic and isolationist policies that 
ostensibly serve to protect Hungary. Since 2010, numerous examples of the 
paranoid style have become evident in Europe (the Austrian, Dutch, and 
French elections, for example), but arguably Hungary was the first to employ
the paranoid style as it currently conceived.
5
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A common theme among invocations of the paranoid style is how the 
paranoid sees “conspiracy as the motive force in historical events” and 
“conspiracy in apocalyptic terms” (Hofstadter 2008, 29). Given the 
perception of such high stakes, the paranoid possesses an unrelenting desire
for victory: 
The paranoid is a militant leader. He does not see social conflict as 
something to be mediated and compromised, in the manner of the 
working politician. Since what is at stake is always a conflict between 
absolute good and absolute evil, the quality needed is not willingness 
to compromise but the will to fight things out to a finish. Nothing but 
complete victory will do.” (Hofstadter 2008, 31, emphasis added)
Enemies cannot be reasoned with, argues the paranoid, therefore they must 
be destroyed. Hofstadter (2008, 31-32) continues,
This enemy is clearly delineated: he is a perfect model of malice, a 
kind of amoral superman: sinister, ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, sensual,
luxury-loving… He is a free, active demonic agent. He wills, indeed he 
manufactures, the mechanism of history himself, or deflects the 
normal course of history in an evil way. 
Important to note, the enemy crafted through the paranoid style is not
simply targeting the paranoid leader, but also “the people” represented by 
the leader. Yet, much like the vague and shadowy enemy looming in the 
midst, “the people” is ill-defined for strategic reasons and allows the 
paranoid rhetor the ability to call a particular “people” into being. Michael 
Calvin McGee (2009, 344) argues that “the people” are created in a speech 
act if individuals make the choice to agree with the speaker: 
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When “one man stands up as the proclaimer of a general will,” what he
says, at the time he originally says it, is a fiction, for it is his personal 
interpretation of his “people’s” history. Though he warrants his 
argument with abundant examples, he creates, not a description of 
reality, but rather a political myth.
These “myths” are at the heart of the paranoid style and serve to fuel 
further paranoia. By outlining the myriad of dangers set against “the 
people,” the right audience accepts the political myth and thus lives in “mass
illusion” (McGee 2009, 345). During times of crises “the people” are more 
susceptible to paranoid appeals, which echoes David Hume’s claim that the 
crux of persuasion is not logic, but rather an appeal to an emotionally guided
intuition (Hume 1983). As Hermann Goering so chillingly described, “Voice or
no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. 
That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and 
denounce pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger.
It works the same way in any country” (Gilbert 1995, 278-79). Both Trump 
and Orbán have been able to call a particular people into being by drawing 
upon the paranoid style to stoke feelings of fear and disgust while 
simultaneously undermining or outright ignoring contradictory arguments.
Much of the power of the paranoid style derives from fact that it is 
hidden in plain sight. Little of what the paranoid leader does in calling upon 
“a people” and crafting an enemy from which the people need to be kept 
secure is kept secret. They do not appear to be working behind closed doors,
even if they are. Unlike earlier manifestations of the paranoid style, however,
7
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the institutions that citizens once relied upon to shed light upon the opaque 
goings on in an administration have been significantly undermined. The 
danger of the current situation is that secrecy is in the open because of the 
proliferation and ubiquity of false narratives and “alternative facts.” The 
confluence of media messages coming from multiple venues and speakers 
allow for a kind of “public secrecy,” wherein attention economies have 
become so saturated and capricious that false narratives, alternative facts, 
and fake news obscure the reality and truth is increasingly more difficult to 
discern. Even when well-meaning citizens, organizations, and news agencies 
attempt to curb misinformation and report accurately, they are battling a 
hydra; when one false story is destroyed, two take its place. False and 
inaccurate information is easy to inject into public discourse, but much more 
difficult and time consuming to legitimately disprove.
The idea of public secrecy is by no means new with numerous 
disciplines addressing the idea in one way or another, including political 
science (Robertson 1982), queer studies (Sedgewick 1991), sociology (Ku 
1997), anthropology (Taussig 1999), women’s studies (Mookherjee 2006), 
and legal studies (Young 2011) amongst others. The scholarship tends the 
idea of public secrecy in one of two ways. The first is what Michael Taussig 
(1999, 5) frames as “knowing what not to know.” Whether it is a small group
or an entire public, such an interpretation of public secrecy is tantamount to 
being complicit in sustaining a state of appearances that does not reflect 
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reality for the sake of maintaining order and/or power. Susan Maret (2011, 
11) calls attention to the second prominent conception of public secrecy, 
which stresses the immense challenge in knowing what is true and what is 
false when the public is oversaturated with too much information. As a 
result, the process of a public coming to a timely judgment on pertinent 
issues becomes complicated if not outright impossible (Gladwell 2007). 
Rather than focusing on one conception of public secrecy, we argue 
that both contribute to and reinforce one another. Given the innumerable 
sources of news media and the ease with which their information 
(sometimes wholly illegitimate) may be spread via social media, the 
problems associated with oversaturation are exponentially worse since 
Gladwell documented them. The same can be said for Jack Bratich’s (2006) 
analysis of public secrecy by way of spectacle in a post-9/11 U.S., which 
highlights the threat of cataclysmic war with a vague, unconventional 
enemy. Despite the harsh critiques of the Bush administration, current 
politicos nonetheless underscore the various ways in which they subscribed 
to traditional norms of governance. In the U.S. and across the Western world
these norms have been all but abandoned. Drawing attention to this 
important issue, we argue that the tactics of public secrecy used by leaders 
Trump and Orbán, particularly their ability to divert attention through control
of the media and rhetorical sleight of hand, serve as a contributing factor to 
the often willful blindness that allows the paranoid to work with the 
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appearance of transparency. Although the methods of obfuscation are 
distinct from traditional modes of secrecy, the end result is nonetheless the 
same. By drawing attention to this global issue, we hope to contribute to the
interdisciplinary study of secrecy and call attention to the subtle power of 
public secrecy as an increasingly prominent authoritarian strategy. 
Paranoid Styles in Hungary and the United States 
As Hofstadter notes, the paranoid style has a long and sordid history. 
There are many facets that make the contemporary moment different, but 
for the purposes of our analysis, we will focus on two aspects of this era that
are relevant for our analysis of the paranoid style. First, the paranoid context
in which we now find ourselves comes after a period marked by a shift 
toward liberalism. In 1989, following the end of Sovietism and the Cold War, 
there was a global transition toward Western liberal democracy and market 
economy. For Francis Fukuyama (1989, 3), this represented an “unabashed 
victory of economic and political liberalism.” Fukuyama (1989, 4) argues 
that, “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the 
passing of a particular period in post war history, but the end of history as 
such: that is, the endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human 
government.” Although not without his critics, Fukuyama was not alone in 
his sentiment that liberal democracy had won. Economist Amartya Sen 
(2001, 5) writes, “while democracy is not yet universally practiced, nor 
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indeed universally accepted, in the general climate of world opinion, 
democratic governance has now achieved the status of being taken to be 
generally right.” Thus, 1989 is a watershed moment in history when 
democratic governance became the right way to govern. As Fukuyama 
notes, many (citizens and political leaders alike) approached the end of the 
millennium with a sense of optimism that all opposition to liberalism would 
be exhausted. Given this, the current turn toward paranoia, and its 
associated nod to isolationism, xenophobia, and illiberalism, seems 
unexpected.
  A second unique characteristic of this contemporary moment is how 
global it is in scale. Journalists and scholars alike have noted that 
authoritarian populism is on the rise in many Western democracies. Populism
is meant to be a socio-political movement that represents the concerns of a 
largely alienated and underrepresented majority. However, populism has 
come to be code for far right-wing political movements. The right-wing party
that becomes the populist party uses the language of “the people” and 
“democracy” in order to justify their almost unquestioned and 
unquestionable power. Populist leaders use dissatisfaction with “politics as 
usual,” economic insecurity, and xenophobia as pivotal issues on which to 
base their claims that the popular opinion of the majority is that the country 
is headed in the wrong direction. From this platform, then, the leader can 
put forth actions that are justified given the desires of the people, even if 
11
Timmer et al.: A Tale of Two Paranoids
Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018
they are uninformed (sometimes misinformed) about the potential 
implications. Populism is now a driving political force in Europe and the 
United States. The Brexit vote, the election of Trump, far right-wing 
candidates in Austria, Italy, France, and The Netherlands, who have 
experienced great support (even though they did not win their elections), 
and the establishment of a strong right-wing government in Poland and a 
movement towards one in the Czech Republic, all are indications of the 
prominence of current populist movements. Hungary, however, was the first 
in Europe, and therefore provides an important case study with Orbán “a 
blueprint for a would-be strongman” (Frum 2017).
  Due to its membership in the European Union, Hungary is by default a 
democracy. In order to be considered for admission, prospective countries 
must demonstrate an adherence to EU values such as freedom of speech, 
religion, press, and movement. However, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has 
unabashedly decried liberal democracy and instead favors an illiberal nation. 
In a 2014 speech given in Băile Tuşnad, Romania, the Prime Minister 
proclaimed, “[The] Hungarian nation is not a simple sum of individuals, but a
community that needs to be organized, strengthened and developed, and in 
this sense, the new state that we are building is an illiberal state, a non-
liberal state” (Orbán 2014, emphasis added).
In calling for illiberalism, Orbán recognizes that his policies are un-
aligned with democratic ideals, but makes the argument he is acting in 
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accord with the Hungarian community. Thus, individual Hungarian citizens 
and members of the broader European community may reject Hungarian 
populist policies, but Orbán maintains that they are for the good of 
Hungarian identity. In the same speech, Orbán (2014) explained, “systems 
that are not Western, not liberal, not liberal democracies and perhaps not 
even democracies, can nevertheless make their nations successful.” 
In order to understand the origins of the current political climate in 
Hungary, it is necessary to give some historical context. Hungary, like all of 
Central and Eastern Europe, was under Soviet rule from the end of World 
War II until 1989. Unlike other former Warsaw Pact countries, however, the 
transition from communism to market economy to democracy was relatively 
smooth. There was no demonstrable exchange of power. The Hungarian 
Socialist Worker’s Party (MSzMP), the ruling party from 1956 to 1989 
reformed themselves as the left-wing Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) in 
1989 and continued to enjoy ruling power. Miklós Neméth, who was prime 
minister during the transition was not ousted but rather simply changed 
political affiliation from MSzMP to MSzP. With the exception of a brief period 
from 1998-2002 when the right-wing party Fidesz held control of the 
government under the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (the same Orbán who 
currently holds leadership), the liberals dominated leadership throughout the
Communist era and well into the 2000s.
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Hungary joined the EU with relative ease in 2004. At this time within 
Europe, Hungary was doing well in terms of social and economic issues, but 
among the populace there was a legitimate and growing distrust of the 
government. Writing at the time, political scientist Eric Beckett Weaver 
(2006, 157) predicted that “unless something changes radically in Hungarian
politics, voters seem likely to remain entrapped in a choice between a former
communist, corrupt socialist coalition, and a corrupt populist elite who insult 
the electorate’s intelligence for some time to come.” Weaver’s prediction 
came true in the same year that his article was written. In September of 
2006, a recording featuring a long expletive-filled rant from then Prime 
Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány was leaked. In this rant, Gyurcsány used fairly 
derogatory language to describe the country and his political party and even 
admitted to lying to the public. This leaked speech became the spark that 
ignited the powder keg of social, economic, and political tensions that had 
been primed and ready to explode throughout Hungary. Protestors from all 
over the country flooded into the capital city. The opposition parties, Fidesz 
or Jobbik, capitalized upon the dissent of the protesters to move their 
platform further to the radical right. Fidesz rhetorically aligned themselves 
with the will of “the people,” the protestors.  Thus, they were well positioned
to easily sweep the parliamentary elections in 2010. As a result, a populist 
right-wing government under the leadership of Viktor Orbán emerged 
victorious and positioned themselves as the people’s party.
14
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Like Hungary, the cultural shifts over the past few decades in the 
United States have helped create an ideological landscape that has allowed 
contemporary right-wing populism to flourish. Hofstadter was inspired to 
write “The Paranoid Style” in large part because of Goldwater’s campaign 
rhetoric. The paranoid style may have always been present to a certain 
degree, ebbing and flowing in times of crisis such as the constitutional 
restrictions noted earlier, but these are often considered shameful moments 
in American history with some even garnering presidential and congressional
apologies. Nonetheless, one particular legacy of the Goldwater campaign has
grown in power and remains today: the Southern Strategy.
  Responding to the Civil Rights Movement and a demographic shift in 
party politics, the Southern Strategy characterizes the change from 
“Dixiecrat” conservative southern democrats to the Republican party as it 
exists in large part today. As African-American citizens left the South for 
Northern metropolitan areas throughout the “great migration” (1915-1960), 
Southern politics became increasingly tied to state’s rights, segregation, 
evangelical religion, and conservative ideology. Barry Goldwater’s Republican
presidential campaign in 1964 and George Wallace’s independent campaign 
in 1968, while unsuccessful in their short-term goal of winning the 
presidency, proved pivotal as they capitalized on the shifting racial 
demographics of the South and the growing tensions between the 
Democratic and Republican parties regarding a range of social issues. 
15
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Acknowledging the changing tide, Nixon adopted many of the same positions
and tactics in order to entice Republican voters in the South, which 
ultimately won him the presidency and reelection. Once a stronghold of 
democratic politics, the South has been reliably Republican ever since and 
dominated by a conservative, Christian worldview.
  Exacerbating the ever-growing ideological divide catalyzed by the 
Southern Strategy was the dismantling of the Fairness Doctrine. 
Implemented in 1949, the Fairness Doctrine was a policy laid down by the 
Federal Communications Commission that regulated broadcasters’ coverage 
of controversial social, political, and economic issues. When addressing 
matters of public importance, broadcasters were required to air competing 
viewpoints fairly in order to provide citizens with a well-rounded perspective 
necessary to render an adequately informed judgment. The policy was 
repealed in 1987 on the grounds that it undermined the First Amendment 
rights of broadcasters. Given the exponential rise in media sources, the 
assumption was that the marketplace of ideas would provide enough 
competition such that the broadcasters, taken as a whole, would cover the 
issues without the need for governmental oversight (Ruane 2011). Removing
the regulation resulted in a deluge of ideologically driven news media. While 
both liberals and conservatives have their broadcasting havens, 
conservatives were much more adept at creating wildly popular national 
programming. The advent of the Internet further magnified the ability of 
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consumers to cater their news experiences so as to complement and 
reinforce their ideological positions.
  The terrorist attacks during and after 9/11 were decisive moments that
continue to shape the socio-political landscape and offered rhetors in the 
U.S. and Europe a framework for defining internal and external threats. 
Following 9/11, the United States significantly increased its security 
infrastructure and ability to monitor communication at home and abroad. 
Waging wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in addition to the numerous other 
military operations throughout the Middle East, Muslims became a primary 
target of fear, disgust, and paranoia overnight, even if they were long 
standing or natural born citizens. Since the terrorist cells were not affiliated 
with any particular government, the “War on Terror” provided ample 
resources to fuel the paranoid style as it undermined the traditional models 
of conflict in favor of a faceless, decentralized enemy force. As a result, 
xenophobia and isolationism became viable, if not necessary, positions for 
many Westerners.
  Additionally, the global economic crisis beginning in 2008 provided yet 
another reason to be wary of an ill-defined “other.” The U.S housing market 
alone is estimated to have lost over $19 trillion in the immediate aftermath 
of the recession (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2012), yet untold trillions 
will be lost in the long-term. Moreover, nearly nine million jobs were lost 
throughout all corners of the U.S. workforce, many of whom also saw 
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significant losses to their retirement plans. Although the employment rate 
has returned to pre-recession numbers, wages have remained virtually 
stagnant for most workers, further increasing income inequality. The impact 
of the Great Recession is vast and will not be fully realized for years, if not 
decades. The immediate impact, however, is obvious in the political rhetoric 
deployed since, as politicians and pundits responded to the economic pinch 
felt by so many Americans. For our present purposes, the economic crisis 
continues to fuel populist appeals and serves as an economic threat that 
compliments the militaristic and cultural threat posed by Muslims. Combined,
they set the stage for the internal and external threats utilized throughout 
paranoid discourse. 
Despite their distinct political, cultural, and economic histories, 
Hungary and the United States share similar discursive themes as embodied 
by their populist leaders. The countries portray themselves as transparent, 
while portend conspiracy theories as a means to hide in plain sight. Indeed, 
with social media and 24-hour news coverage, the public is more aware than
ever about what politicians appear to be doing, which becomes a 
performative element of the paranoid style. With their unique histories in 
mind, we argue that two prominent aspects of public secrecy-control of the 
media and sleight of hand-are embedded in the discourses of their paranoid 
leaders, yet manifest in discrete ways due to the different circumstances 
that led to their respective surges in populism.
18
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Control of the Media
Perhaps the most ubiquitous and effective way in which Trump and 
Orbán have been able to work in public secrecy is through the control of the 
media. The two leaders (and their respective parties and administrations) 
employ different strategies, but the end result is the same. The 
manipulations of the leader are hidden behind a veil of media chaos. For 
Trump, the media, unless favorable to him, is fake and conspiratorial. For 
example, on May 28th he tweeted, “the Fake News Media works hard at 
disparaging & demeaning my use of social media because they don't want 
America to hear the real story!” (@realDonaldTrump, May, 28, 2017). The 
media is the ideal scapegoat. Orbán has a far greater ability to construct and
control the Hungarian mediascape, and justifies his control of media outlets, 
because unchecked they become enemies of the state. 
Media in both the United States and Hungary are protected by the 
freedom of press, but in Hungary, Orbán found many means through which 
to control media dissemination. Such power is more available to him in a 
small country (population approximately 10 million), which is only a few 
decades removed from authoritarian rule. The media landscape in the United
State can be characterized as an echo chamber. There are so many outlets 
producing messages in so many forums that consumers find it difficult to 
make sense of the many messages with which they are assaulted. Rather, as
explained by the theory of selective exposure, audiences tend to seek out 
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media that affirm their already-held beliefs, and rarely venture from that 
space. To do so causes cognitive dissonance, an inability for the brain to 
comfortably negotiate information that it finds to be in conflict with strongly-
held beliefs. While this is certainly not a new concept when it comes to 
media consumption, the 24-hour cable news cycle, the rise of Fox News and 
MSNBC, and social media use has magnified this. Individuals are flooded 
with an array sources and options for media consumption. What appears to 
be freedom of choice and access to endless sources has, oddly enough, 
turned into a prison of our own creation. Individuals have the illusion of 
control in this system, but are forced to pare down these choices, usually 
resulting in the creation of media bubbles and silos, echo chambers where 
individuals have selectively exposed themselves to like-minded thinking that 
not only doesn’t challenge their worldviews, but sometimes represents 
“alternative facts” not rooted in reality. To venture out of these silos is to be 
inundated and buried under information that doesn’t fit with the user’s view 
of reality.
  Selective exposure is impossible to avoid given the saturated media 
marketplace. It’s true danger lies in the ideological amplification initiated by 
selective exposure and the echo chamber, which is capitalized upon by the 
paranoid leader. Ideological amplification occurs when an ideological position
(e.g. liberal and conservative) is pushed toward a more extreme position, 
despite introducing new information or engaging counterarguments 
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(Sunstein 2007). Cass Sunstein (2003) notes three contributing elements: 
conformity, group polarization, and social cascades. Although the three feed 
off one another, the cascades and group polarization are more relevant to 
our discussion of media. This polarization allows for “secrecy” to flourish in 
plain sight; either audiences choose not to expose themselves to any 
disparate viewpoint or they are able to dismiss news that doesn’t fit their 
narrative.
Group polarization occurs “when group members, engaged in 
deliberation with one another, end up taking a more extreme position in line 
with their predeliberation tendencies” (Sunstein 2003, 11). For example, if a 
group of conservative supporters of the 2nd Amendment were to discuss gun 
rights, they are more likely to leave that exchange defending more extreme 
interpretations of gun rights. Important to note, there is often no new 
information contributed, just the power of the echo chamber. This problem is
exacerbated when discussions take place online in self-selected enclaves. 
Internet users are able to select the individuals they follow on Twitter, the 
friends they have on Facebook, and the news organizations they visit. Since 
they are likely to seek out liberal or conservative websites that reaffirm their
ideological beliefs, polarization is increasingly likely and growing ever more 
extreme. After years of unregulated cable news and talk radio, and the 
precipitous rise of social media, the paranoid leader has a group already 
primed to support their extreme positions. The result is an audience that 
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both accepts obfuscation, while contributing to it through the creation of 
self-limiting ideological positions that frame both the creation and 
consumption of public discourse. In an ironic twist, publicity, once thought of
as an important aspect of healthy deliberation and a bulwark against the 
worst impulses paranoia, is now a successful part of the paranoid leader’s 
strategy, whereas traditional forms of political secrecy, deliberations “behind 
closed doors,” may in fact produce healthier, more critical discourse 
(Chambers 2004). 
  Donald Trump has used this abundance of (mis)information as a 
means of social control. Not only has his White House policies rewritten what
is considered legitimate “news,” but Trump has also taken this a step further 
by deeming certain outlets “fake news,” and maligning the mainstream news
enemy through his Twitter account and endorsing those sites, channels, and 
organization that paint him in a favorable light. This tweet, for example, 
shows both tactics: “The fake news media is going crazy with their 
conspiracy theories and blind hatred. @MSNBC & @CNN are unwatchable. 
@foxandfriends is great!” (@realDonaldTrump. February 15, 2017). Trump 
has essentially cashed in on a populace already divided not just politically, 
but in terms of reality and facts. He has deepened the chasm through 
Twitter. The irony that this medium was once seen as being a tool for 
democracy and open information (e.g., during the Arab Spring) should not 
be lost. At the same time, it also cannot be ignored that in Trump’s tweets, 
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speeches, and interviews he adds fuel to the fire, more information to 
submerge actual fact beneath the ever-present cacophony of media stories.
While Trump attempts to control the narrative by maligning the press, 
Orbán has the ability to control it more directly. One of Orbán’s first acts as 
Prime Minister was to change the mediascape to suit his purposes to help 
him maintain power and sway the political climate in Hungary. Orbán created
a single, centralized media authority with a government appointed media 
official vested with ministerial-level powers such that media messages are 
filtered through the government. Media researcher Péter Bajomi-Lazar, 
explains, 
in a plural landscape, media doesn’t have much of an impact, but in 
Hungary, media have been put in the service of a majoritarian 
government dedicated to establishing ideological hegemony in an 
attempt to change public opinion and voting behavior in the long run in
order to cement its power. (Howden 2016)
Such control is made possible because he majority of Hungarians get their 
news from television. As Anita (a pseudonym), another media researcher, 
explains, “you can find a lot of views and all sorts of different types of 
information online, so in that sense there is pluralism and all sorts of 
diversity, but as well all know, most Hungarians get their news from TV, from
broadcasting and that is way more problematic” (personal communication, 
2016). 
As both Bajomi-Lazar and Anita indicate, the government control of 
the media in Hungary is successful because the mediascape is small, limited 
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in scope, and relatively homogenous. Thus, Orbán is able to manipulate 
media messages to create the illusion of openness, while, in reality, working 
in secrecy. There are only three broadcasting services in Hungary. The 
national station, MTVA, is essentially the mouthpiece of the government. Of 
the other two commercial stations, Anita states, “TV2 is now basically 
turning into another governmental channel. RTL is still standing but they’re 
under pressure, constant pressure, because the government is using various
means to influence media in Hungary” (personal communication, 2017). 
Anita asserts that the mediascape in Hungary is now a state media only 
representing the government’s voice.
Control of media, however, is not limited to control of broadcast 
television. Print and online journalists also have found themselves under 
attack. In an article for the Web site Refugees Deeply, Daniel Howden 
provides examples of journalists from origo.hu (a well-known left-leaning 
online news source) and the Budapest Business Journal, who felt pressured 
to alter their stories or resign (Howden 2016). In both cases, the journalists 
resigned, rather than compromise their ethics; they felt remorse for not 
doing more to challenge the system from within and leaving a space in which
journalists who aligned themselves with the ruling party could infiltrate the 
publications. In 2011, Klubrádió, a news and talk radio station known to be 
the voice of left liberal opposition that began broadcasting in 1999, was 
denied renewal of their license. This led to a fairly long legal battle which 
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Klubrádió eventually won in 2013. As Tamás Bodoky of Átlátszó 
(Transparent), a civil watchdog organization asserted, “there are fewer and 
fewer workplaces for journalists willing to expose corruption and they mostly
exist on the internet” (Bienvenu 2016).
Perhaps the most notable example of the government’s overreach is 
the sudden closure of the country’s long-standing newspaper, Népszabadság.
On September 30, 2015, the paper, one of the premier leftist national 
newspapers, was suddenly shut down. The owner cited loss of readership 
and loss of revenue, but employees saw the closing as Orbán’s doing. 
Journalists showed up to work only to find they were out of a job. Online 
readers logged on that morning to find a letter explaining the closure. Even 
the archives were removed, although they have since been restored. It is 
true that the paper was losing readers. While circulation numbers in the 
1990s were in the hundreds of thousands, by 2013 circulation was only 46 
thousand, but even with this drop off, the paper boasted the highest 
readership amongst the political dailies. As such, the closure of 
Népszabadság is seen as being highly symbolic. The word népszabadság 
means the people’s liberty. The left-leaning paper was founded during the 
1956 Revolution and therefore is associated with the spirit of the people’s 
rebellion.
   For both Trump and Orbán media is the enemy when it is the voice of 
opposition. The paranoid, in order to maintain his position of discursive 
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superiority, must frame the oppositional voices in the media as “fake,” “evil,”
or conspiratorial. Given their disparate histories and media ecologies, Trump 
and Orbán must deploy different rhetorical strategies in order to achieve the 
control over the media they so desire. In the case of either, framing the 
oppositional voice as the enemy serves to illuminate a particular read of the 
media while simultaneously obscuring what truth the media may indeed 
offer. As public focus shifts to attend to the framing of media, other issues, 
policies, or ideologies are subsequently obscured. The result is an ability to 
be perceived of as a transparent voice of the people when their true 
machinations are hidden in plain sight. As such, the ability to engage in 
rhetorical sleight of hand becomes increasingly easy.
Sleight of Hand and the Element of Distraction
A glut of information and limited attention spans allow the paranoid 
leader to draw attention to one particular issue while deflecting the 
importance of others. There are many ways in which paranoid rhetors 
distract the public but here we will focus on one: the creation of a real and 
present enemy. Through Twitter storms (Trump) or nation-wide referendums
and billboard campaigns (Orbán), the leaders convince their public that 1) an
enemy exists, 2) the enemy presents a real and present threat, and 3) the 
enemy is more dangerous than any other potential threat. This enemy is an 
ideal scapegoat into which all malice is poured. In his analysis of Adolf 
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Hitler’s Mein Kampf, Kenneth Burke calls attention to the rhetorical power of 
the scapegoat, especially for a population going through cultural, political, or
economic tumult. The creation of a scapegoat provides “‘curative’ process” 
that allows one to transfer the complex, diverse problems of a society into a 
sacrificial other, “thereby accomplishing a purification by dissociation” (Burke
1974, 202). 
Particularly important for the current rhetorical situation is the ability 
to provide a “noneconomic interpretation of economic ills” (Burke 1974, 
204), which allows the paranoid a way to circumvent the complexities of the 
problems facing society. Thus, it follows that in sacrificing any responsibility 
for one’s own problems and in identifying an individual group as the root of 
these problems, hatred and self-justification are allowed to grow. As time 
passes, this hatred builds until, as Hofstadter (2008, 201) outlines, “the 
enemy is thought of as being totally evil and totally unappeasable” and the 
only apparent solution is that “he must be totally terminated.” As a result, 
these movements take the first steps of a process that can end only one of 
two ways: the complete eradication of the scapegoat or the failure of the 
movement.
  As adherents to the paranoid style, both Trump and Orbán draw 
attention to evil forces in their speeches and rhetorical positioning. Trump 
relied upon the enemy of the “illegal” immigrant by Mexicans as “rapists” 
and “murderers.” These people who purportedly committed the most heinous
27
Timmer et al.: A Tale of Two Paranoids
Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018
crimes needed to be kept out at any cost, therefore necessitating the 
building of a wall that would cost billions of dollars. For Orbán, migrants are 
clearly posited as an external threat waiting to attack and the wall is not 
theoretical. In 2015, in response to the dramatic increase in asylum seekers 
entering coming into the EU, a razor wire fence was erected along Hungary’s
southern border specifically to keep them out. For Trump, democratic 
institutions become the “enemy of the people,” which justified blocking press
access and actively supporting the notion that American elections are rigged.
Political opponents became the reason these evils pervaded all corners of 
American life and Trump positioned himself as the only person who could 
respond to these ubiquitous enemies. The political enemy for Orbán is the 
European Union, which he posits as serving the interests of Western Europe 
and does not stand for Hungary, as he does. 
True to their paranoid style, the goals are unrealistic which can be a 
source of frustration for the leader. Trump has doubled-down on his goals 
when faced with opposition, tweeting “it is amazing how often I am right, 
only to be criticized by the media. Illegal immigration, take the oil, build the 
wall, Muslims, NATO!” (@realDonaldTrump, March 15, 2016). Trump 
reasserted his credibility and lists off the policy positions that he is correct 
about. Orbán makes similar claims. While not wont to make random 
statements on Twitter, in his speeches he holds himself up as the defender of
Europe, the only one willing to stand up against the dangerous tide of 
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unchecked mass migration. In a 2017 essay written for the National Review, 
Orbán (2017) explains, 
Hungary may not be counted among the larger EU member states, but
owing to its geographical situation, it has more than once acted as a 
conduit of historic change...Responsibility for ensuring controlled 
crossing rests with those states on an EU external border, so we had 
no choice but to erect a physical barrier.
For the paranoid leader admittance of any type of wrongdoing or 
misguidance is not an option. Moreover, his public performance must exude 
strength thus allowing him to deflect criticisms as weak or complicit with the 
enemy conspirators. 
The enemy is a careful creation—faceless enemies who lurk in the 
shadows, subversive cabals of particular ideological bent looking to unravel 
civil society, or terrorists lurking among the unwashed as they pour, 
unchecked, over the border. The enemy of each culture is, in part, an empty 
vessel, bound to a term or body of terms filled with culturally bound 
understandings. Michael Calvin McGee attempts to make sense of the power 
of these abstract terms and the way in which they are utilized to summon 
and promote collective commitment as a means of promoting a particular 
ideological or normative goal. McGee (1980, 6) defines the ideograph as "a 
high-order abstraction, representing collective commitment to a particular 
but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal,” a term that evokes a particular 
cultural understanding of reality. For a term to summon the ideological power 
of the collective at the level of an ideograph, McGee argues that it must 
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by-its-nature be abstract, representative of a collective, culture-bound series 
of beliefs, function to support an ill-defined normative goal, and in doing so, 
function to at times excuse eccentric behaviors or beliefs (McGee 1980, 15). 
The enemy is not, by itself, an ideograph. Rather, it is a part of our 
understanding of "security" as an ideographic expression. Consider, for 
instance, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. While the American public might not 
have been willing to sacrifice fundamental freedoms for the sake of stopping 
terrorism, a notion we see even today with the resistance to a surveillance 
state, significant sacrifices were made for the purposes of protecting the 
American "security." In his defense of the Act, George W. Bush (2006) 
stated:
The law allows our intelligence and law enforcement officials to 
continue to share information. It allows them to use tools 
against terrorists that they used against—that they use against 
drug dealers and other criminals. It will improve our nation’s 
security while we safeguard the civil liberties of our people. The 
legislation strengthens the Justice Department so it can better 
detect and disrupt terrorist threats. And the bill gives law 
enforcement new tools to combat threats to our citizens from 
international terrorists to local drug dealers.
The focus on Bush’s defense of the Act was not the enemy, but rather the 
security that the enemy undermined. In this way, the terrorist and the drug 
dealer become the scapegoat sacrificed on the altar of American "security." 
In the current context, when we consider the paranoid style utilized in the 
Orbán and Trump administrations, "security" rears its ugly head once again, 
but the nature of the enemy has changed significantly in both nature and 
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scope. This becomes particularly clear when we examine the manner in which 
peoples crossing the borders (whether they are called migrants, refugees, 
immigrants, aliens, or asylum seekers), are constructed as an enemy that 
threatens security.
In his the 2015 speech announcing his presidential run, Trump put a 
face on the Mexican immigrant: 
When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re 
not sending you. They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that
have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. 
They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And 
some, I assume, are good people. (Washington Post Staff 2015)
In part, Trump’s creation of the immigrant as enemy was dependent on 
drawing from an existential economic crisis. The proposed solution to this 
crisis was a border wall, funded by the Mexican government between the US 
and its southern neighbor. Although the illegal immigrant has long been 
viewed as an economic threat, Trump played to a narrative that could be 
traced back to the “War on Drugs,” which began in the Nixon administration 
and gained additional traction under the presidencies of Richard Nixon and 
George H. W. Bush. Despite the fact that the war on drugs is now viewed as 
a failure, the narrative tying the immigrant to the trafficking of drugs along 
the U.S. southern border continues to persist as can be seen in the third 
presidential debate in October 2016; Trump’s perspective on the immigrant 
continued to promote the narrative associating the immigrant with drugs and
crime: 
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One of my first acts will be to get all of the drug lords, all of the 
bad ones—we have some bad, bad people in this country that 
have to go out. We’re going to get them out. We’re going to 
secure the border. And once the border is secured, at a later 
date, we’ll make a determination as to the rest. But we have 
some bad hombres here, and we’re going to get them out. 
(Zezima 2016)
While the immigrant poses a culturally understood economic and 
criminal threat, a second, more powerful manifestation of the paranoid style 
presents itself insofar as the immigrant is connected to Islamic terrorism. In 
many ways, terrorism represents the perfect enemy for a purveyor of the 
paranoid style, in that the terrorist, by its very nature, is a faceless enemy. 
Unlike the Communist threat of the Cold War, which was embedded within 
the context of a nation state, terrorism is a decentralized threat deeply 
embedded in the American cultural psyche since September 11th. As Trump 
stresses the immigrant as criminal narrative, he promotes the idea that 
suggests the terrorists wait to cross the border like wolves among sheep 
which lends itself to the kind of imaginative leap necessary to create and 
maintain a paranoid conspiracy. In a 2016 speech delivered in Youngstown, 
Ohio, Trump promoted the notion of extreme vetting of visa applicants to the
US. In the speech, he suggested that they presented an existential threat to 
the "security" of American citizens, a claim made more plausible by the fears
present within post-9/11 US culture, particularly after terrorist attacks in 
Brussels, France, and Germany in the months following his speech. In one 
sense, framing the immigrant as enemy is designed to evoke an ideological 
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response, drawing the current notions of the enemy to safety and security as
a means of defining the relationship between the culture and the immigrant. 
At the same time, the manner in which Trump frames the immigrant as 
enemy draws upon the power of spectacle in public secrecy. The identity of 
the enemy, shrouded in abstraction, performed controversially, limits the 
interpretation of the identity of the enemy behind a wall of public outrage 
and discourse. “The secret has become spectacular, renewing the power of 
the spectacle as it appropriates the powers of secrecy for itself” (Bratich 
2006, 498).
While Trump merely suggested a relationship between the immigrant 
and terrorism with his campaign speeches and tweets regarding a potential 
“Muslim ban,” he made the connection between the immigrant, terrorism, 
"security" and the economy during his acceptance speech for the RNC 
nomination: “The American People will come first again. My plan will begin 
with safety at home—which means safe neighborhoods, secure borders and 
protection from terrorism. There can be no prosperity without law and order”
(Associated Press 2016). Later in the speech, the Republican nominee for 
president seamlessly moved between discussions of stopping Islamic 
terrorism, vetting of Syrian refugees, and his profound sense of concern 
regarding violence at the U.S./Mexico border: “Of all my travels in this 
country, nothing has affected me more deeply than the time I have spent 
with the mothers and fathers who have lost their children to violence spilling 
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across our border” (Associated Press 2016). In making the terrorist and the 
immigrant synonymous, Trump evokes not one, but two ideologically fueled 
paranoid responses from his audience. First, he draws on the cultural history
of America and terrorism to stoke the fears born out of the post-9/11 world 
and the paranoid concerns of the Bush administration. Secondly, Trump links
those very fears to fundamentally change the cultural understanding of the 
immigrant—presenting the immigrant, the criminal, and the terrorist as 
synonymous and creating the opportunity for drastic measures to address 
the problem. After all, what American wouldn’t want to stop an army of 
terrorists from pouring over the southern border? In both cases, the power 
of linking the terrorist and the immigrants to “the enemy” limits the 
responses of the audience within the field of appropriate responses, 
obscuring what is possible beneath an ideologically grounded “appropriate” 
response. 
Orbán has used similar strategies as Trump to frame outsiders as 
enemy. For Orbán, the outsiders in question are asylum seekers from Syria, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and northern Africa who began entering the country in 
unprecedented numbers in June of 2015. Their goal was to reach Germany, 
a country purportedly welcoming to refugees. However, to get to Germany, 
they first had to enter Hungary as the border country of the Schengen Area, 
the region within which free travel is permitted. Furthermore, according to 
the Dublin Regulation, asylum seekers must request asylum in the EU 
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country where they first arrive. Thus, Hungary was overwhelmed with asylum 
requests. Interestingly enough, while Hungary was not prepared to meet the 
needs of the asylum seekers, Orbán was fully prepared to demonize them as 
a threat as he began the construction of the migrant as enemy months 
before the “crisis” began. Migration was not considered a national concern 
until January 2015. Following the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, Orbán made 
a now famous speech in which he warned the Hungarian people of the 
dangers associated with economic migration. At the time of that speech, 
Fidesz had experienced a decline in support, but the speech appeared 
to resonate with the populace. With that migration became an important 
political cause to rally public support. As one political analyst claimed, 
“as long as migration is top of the agenda, [Fidesz’s] popularity goes up. 
They have to keep up the momentum” (Howden 2016). In the months that 
followed, the government launched a national consultation meant to measure 
the public response on migrants through push-poll survey questionnaires. In
letters sent with the questionnaires, Orbán writes to Hungarian citizens, 
“economic migrants cross our border illegally, and while they present 
themselves as asylum-seekers, in fact they are coming to enjoy our welfare 
systems and the employment opportunities our country has to offer… This 
represents a new type of threat – a threat which we must stop in its tracks” 
(Website of the Hungarian Government 2017). With such biased questions as 
“Do you agree with the Hungarian government that support should be 
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focused more on Hungarian families and the children they can have rather 
than on immigration?,” the survey revealed (or constructed) an anti-immigrant
bias. As a result, the government engaged in an anti-immigrant, xenophobic 
billboard campaign, which displayed the country’s stance and 
sent a message to migrants not to come to Hungary (Timmer 2017).
The billboard campaign preceded the actual influx of refugees. In June 
2015, the crisis, as it came to be known, began. From June to September, 
thousands of asylum seekers fled across Hungary’s southern border. An 
unprecedented number of volunteers mobilized to provide assistance to the 
refugees, but the government, already having taking an anti-immigrant 
stance, was unmotivated to act in manner that facilitated refugees’ 
movement through the country. Instead, the government mandated the 
construction of a fence which began in July. In September 2015, the fence 
was closed at the Hungarian-Serbian border and in October at the 
Hungarian-Croatian border. They <who is they? made “irregular border 
crossing” illegal and declared Serbia a safe third country so that if an asylum
seeker entered through Serbia, they could be sent back
Before the closing of the border fence, volunteers continued to provide
refugees in the train station with food, clothing, tents, charging stations, and
Wi-Fi access. Meanwhile, the government’s position on the migrants made 
the volunteers into criminals. As the spokesperson of the government 
explained: “Is it an act of volunteerism or help or is it contributing to the 
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self-treating mechanism that’s actually desired by the government, by the 
agencies, authorities trying to cope with this? If you give free Wi-Fi at Keleti 
train station, everybody is going to go there….it’s against the law” (personal 
communication, 2016). To be clear, no volunteer was ever arrested or under 
threat of arrest, but the government treated the migrants as criminals, and 
thus helping them was ultimately a criminal act.
Humanitarians have faced recent threats by the current administration.
On June 13, 2017, a bill passed Parliament that will require additional 
measures for foreign backed NGOs, a move that has been called an 
“intimidation of civil society” (Tait 2017). NGO workers, humanitarians, and 
volunteers are also seen to be on the wrong side of public opinion. This 
public opinion has been carefully crafted through not only the survey and the
billboard campaign, but also government control of the media discussed 
previously. Meanwhile, the government has been bolstered. Due to a failure 
to act on the part of the EU and a movement toward right-wing populism 
throughout the Europe, EU policy on migrants and refugees has started to 
look more like Hungary’s – one of exclusion. Hungary supports a policy of 
taking care of refugees outside of the borders of the European Union. They 
have been vocal supporters of an arrangement with Turkey in which the EU 
would provide funding to Turkey to keep refugees there. Orbán sees Brexit 
and the election of Donald Trump as evidence that the Hungarian policies are
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to be lauded. In a speech, Trump said that Hungary has gone from being 
stigmatized and marginalized to being on the right side of history.
  As in the United States, the effort to protect the borders in Hungary 
stems from the need to ensure the "security" of the citizenry. Orbán’s 
xenophobic campaign began as a reaction to the Charlie Hebdo attacks in 
Paris and every subsequent European attack has bolstered Orbán’s claim 
that his anti-immigrant stance is the only right and moral one. For example, 
in a March 15, 2016 speech, Orbán decried European policies of integration 
and tolerance. “Europe is not free,” he asserted,
Because freedom begins with speaking the truth. Today in 
Europe it is forbidden to speak the truth…It is forbidden to say 
that those arriving are not refugees, but that Europe is 
threatened by migration. It is forbidden to say that tens of 
millions are ready to set out in our direction. It is forbidden to 
say that that immigration brings crime and terror to our 
countries. It is forbidden to point out that the masses arriving 
from other civilizations endanger our way of life, our culture, our
customs, and our Christian traditions. (Orbán  2016)
Orbán's speech continues in this manner. There have, however, been no 
attacks or threats of attacks on Hungary’s soil. Furthermore, the success of 
the actions of the government will likely ensure that such attacks do not 
happen. The border fence serves as a visible reminder that the people are 
both protected and in danger. Because it is a fence that is easily traversable 
by cheap wire cutters, constant vigilance is needed in the form of border 
patrol guards. Due to recent legislation, patrollers can send anyone they 
catch back to the transit zone to legally make their asylum claim, a claim 
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that is almost guaranteed to be denied. Doctors without Borders have 
reported that those caught by the border guards are beat and forced under 
threat of bodily harm to admit their guilt of illegally crossing the border 
(Médecins Sans Frontières 2017). The guards, however, are justified in their 
actions because they are protecting the safety of the Hungarian people and 
even the people of the entire European Union. 
As Orbán posits in this speech and many others, migrants threaten 
both Hungarian physical safety and economic livelihood. Recent terrorist 
attacks throughout Europe can lead to a heightened sense of fear. Evidence 
that these attacks have largely been carried out by radicalized second and 
third generation immigrants does little to alleviate fears that the terrorists 
are steaming in through open borders. Thus events, traumatic as they are, 
become tools populist leaders can use to maintain fear. Additionally, 
migrants threaten economic security. Many Hungarians report feeling a lack 
of economic security since salaries are low compared to other European 
countries and Hungarians find it difficult to save. As such, this too is an 
easily manipulatable fear. The billboard campaign, mentioned previously, 
draws upon both of these inherent fears. For example, one message read, “If
you come to Hungary, you must keep our laws.” A second read, “Do not 
come to Hungary to take our jobs.” These messages were ostensibly sent to 
the migrants, but they were written in Hungarian – a language one can 
assume asylum seekers coming from the Middle East and Northern Africa do 
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not speak – so it is clear that the intended audience was the Hungarian 
public. Like the fence, these billboards sent the message to Hungarians that 
they are under threat but that their government could protect them.
Through Trump’s speeches and tweets and Orbán's speeches, 
consultations, and billboards, both leaders carefully crafted a message of 
paranoia and fear. In doing so, they have distracted the public’s attention 
away from other issues of great political importance. This rhetorical sleight 
of hand, through the creation of existential threats, provides another clear 
example of open secrecy. 
Conclusion
In this article, we looked at the use of the paranoid style of two world 
leaders, highlighting how they have used the performance of “openness” to 
actually engage in extreme and dangerous forms of public secrecy. Trump 
and Orbán have controlled media narratives, constructed internal and 
external threats, and engaged in misdirection. At its most extreme, the 
American and Hungarian publics are the victims of gaslighting. Attempts on 
the part of both of these leaders to lead the public to question their own 
understandings of collective memory and history are exemplified through 
their public secrecy by which they assert control and maintain the illusion of 
truth in deception. 
It is important to compare these two leaders; although they come 
from two very different nations with very different histories, since coming 
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onto the political stage, Trump and Orbán have employed very similar 
strategies and messages, representative of the paranoid style imbued with 
public secrecy. The two have followed very similar trajectories and in many 
cases Orbán, as a benefit of being in office longer, has already achieved what
Trump has set out to do. 
 The relationship between Trump and Orbán beyond this theoretical 
one is unclear. Orbán could be seen in the now infamous video of the world 
leaders at NATO in May 2017 when Trump physically pushed the Prime 
Minister of Montenegro out of the way in order to move to the front of the 
pack. Prior to this moment, Trump was talking to Viktor Orbán. Another 
connection can be seen through the appointment of Sebastian Gorka, a 
Hungarian-American with clear connections to right-wing groups in Hungary, 
who served as the deputy assistant to the president until May 2017, when he
was asked to leave his position. Orbán was the first world leader to endorse 
Trump’s candidacy and announced that his inauguration represented the 
“end of multilateralism,” and thus asserted that his country (and others) 
would now have carte blanche to put their interest above those of their 
neighbors and the broader good. In a National Review article, Orbán praised 
Trump specifically on three counts: first, his proposal to create the best 
secret service in the world; second, his abandonment of the policy of 
exporting democracy “as if it were soap or a cell phone, usable in all markets
with no side effects;” and third, Trump’s promise to reinforce borders. Orbán
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(2017) writes, “Trump’s proposals at least acknowledges such threats and 
propose solutions to them Europe by contrast has avoided dealing 
realistically with threats.” 
With the recent emergence of right-wing populism continuing to gain 
prominence, Western democracies are enduring yet another wave of growing
pains as they reflect upon and respond to an ever evolving spate of political, 
economic, technological, and cultural changes. The impact of these changes 
and the responses to them may very well echo for generations to come, 
which makes the present moment all the more critical. Not all national or 
international threats are formulated through clandestine means; in the cases
of Orbán and Trump, the secrecy and manipulation is happening in plain 
sight. History may not be a guide for the future, but it nonetheless provides 
a series of cautionary tales and we would be wise to heed them.
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